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COMMENTS
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS IN NEBRASKA'
The administrative agency is now an essential part of our gov-
ernmental system, and this great growth of the agency and the in-
crease in its functions leads to a variety of difficult problems for the
lawyer. The finality which the determinations of an agency
should be accorded has long been a major problem. The purpose
of this comment is to examine the scope of review exercised by
the courts in Nebraska. The standard of review used by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in reviewing administrative determinations
will be compared to appellate review for jury cases and non-jury
cases in Nebraska, as well as to the standards used on the federal
level. Such an examination, it is hoped, will provide some insight
into the adequacy of the existing scope of review, and into ap-
propriate remedial changes. Those agencies which are not generally
concerned with problems on a state basis are not specifically cov-
ered, and a discusion of the injunction and the writ of mandamus
has been purposely omitted as outside the scope of this paper.
There is a great variety of statutory provisions regarding both
the appeal from agency determinations and the type of review
to be given. It should be noted that unless such an appeal is pro-
vided for, other methods of obtaining judicial review must be
used.2  The scope of review granted will vary with the statutory
provisions covering the particular agency; and, of course, the type
of review provided should vary with the type and nature of the ad-
ministrative action and procedure. There is not at the present time
any statutory provision in the Nebraska Administrative Procedure
Act3 covering the scope of judicial review, but there has been an
attempt to get such legislation through the Unicameral.4 The prob-
1 For a compilation of various tests used in the scope of judicial review
of administrative agencies in selected areas in all of the states see
Report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals,
63 A.B.A. REP. 623 (1938).
2If a statutory method of appeal has not been provided, the right to ap-
peal does not exist; and a litigant may obtain judicial review only by
a petition in error in the district court or, perhaps, by the use of one
of the extraordinary remedies. See Roberts v. City of Mitchell, 131
Neb. 672, 269 N.W. 515 (1936). This point, as well as the scope ofjudicial review in such cases, will be discussed later.
3 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -915 (Supp. 1961).
4L. B. 133, 68th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1957). This bill provided: "Sec. 9 . ..(5) The review shall be conducted as a de novo proceeding by the court
without a jury. (6) The court may affirm the decision of the agency
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lem can best be approached by examining three different situa-
tions: (1) Where the legislature has provided for a statutory ap-
peal but has not defined the scope of review, thus leaving that
question open to a determination by the court; (2) Where there
are statutory provisions providing for an appeal and the scope of
review is defined by statute; and (3) Where no statutory appeal is
provided and the party is left to a petition in error.
I. STATUTORY APPEAL WITH NO STATUTORY
DEFINITION OF THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
The administrative agencies for which there is provided a
statutory appeal, but for which there are no statutory provisions
regarding the scope of review are few.5 The best known class of
cases are those which arise on appeal from the State Railway Com-
mission. Almost all of the litigation in the area of administrative
law in Nebraska is concerned with this Commission, and the basic
test for the scope of judicial review is found primarily in its cases.
The direct appeal from the State Board of Equalization and Assess-
ment falls within this category, as well as appeals from the De-
partment of Water Resources.7 The test which the court uses in
this area is easy to state; but, by the very nature of the words in-
or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify
the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been
prejudiced because the agency decision is: (a) In violation of con-
stitutional provisions; (b) In excess of the statutory authority or juris-
diction of the agency; (c) Made upon unlawful procedure; (d) Af-
fected by other error of law; (e) Unsupported by competent, material,
and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as made on review;
or (f) Arbitrary or capricious. . . . " The governor's veto message is
found in NEB. LEG. J. 2019, 68th Sess. (1957). The above provision, with
the exception of the provision for a de novo proceeding, is the same
as the corresponding section of the MODEL ACT. See MODEL STATE AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 12 (7) [Hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
Those agencies which have such statutory standards generally provide
for de novo review. This class of cases will be covered in a later sec-
tion which will include all types of review which are broader or nar-
rower than the test to be set out in this section with the exception of
the petition in error.
6 NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-510 (Reissue 1958) provides for an appeal to the
Supreme Court from a final decision of the board with respect to the
valuation of any real or personal property. This is to be distinguished
from an appeal from a reassessment by the state board (§ 77-313), an
appeal from an assessment of railroad property (§§ 77-613 to -618), and
appeals from county boards of equalization (§§ 77-1510 to -1511) (Supp.
1961). All of these cases will be considered in a later section since the
review is different, at least according to the applicable statutes.
7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-210 (Supp. 1961).
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volved, it is difficult to apply. This is not to say, however, that
the inherent vagueness of any test involving terms such as "reason-
able" is necessarily undesirable or, indeed, that any more satis-
factory test could be found.8 Likewise, such a test may not be any
more vague, or any less susceptible to precise definition, than simi-
lar legal standards in other areas of the law.
Section 75-4059 of the Nebraska statutes provides that orders
or decisions of the Railway Commission may be appealed directly
to the Supreme Court where they may be reversed, modified, or
vacated. The procedure is the same as that in force for appeals
from the district court to the Nebraska Supreme Court. 0 The orders
of the Commission and the findings of facts and conclusions in the
record are "prima facie evidence of every fact found, and that such
order or orders are prima facie just and reasonable."" The statute
also provides that certain orders are to be in effect until annulled,
modified or reversed, or until adjudged "unreasonable or unjust."'12
These statutory guides are rarely mentioned by the court, 3 and
the exact meaning and effect of them has never been fully ex-
plained. It would seem that the court has arrived at about the same
standard without quoting the statute. 4 The scope of review with
respect to the sufficiency of the evidence under the statutes was first
s For example, Professor Davis when speaking of the meaning of the term
"substantial evidence" says that it is about as clear and about as vague
as it should be. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 at 118
(1958) [Hereinafter cited as DAVIs].
9 NEB. REV. STAT. § 75-405 (Reissue 1958).
10 The statute for the Department of Water Resources provides for es-
sentially the same procedure. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-210 (Reissue 1960).
For the procedure for appeals from the district court to the Nebraska
Supreme Court see §§ 25-1911 to -1929 (Reissue 1956).
11 NEB. REV. STAT. § 75-415 (Reissue 1958).
12 NEB. REv. STAT. § 75-416 (Reissue 1958). This section refers to the orders
provided for in §§ 75-412 to -415.
13 Strasheim v. Martin, 169 Neb. 787, 101 N.W.2d 161 (1960); Miller v.
Consolidated Motor Freight, Inc., 168 Neb. 712, 97 N.W.2d 265 (1959);
Houk v. Beckley, 161 Neb. 143, 72 N.W.2d 664 (1955); Safeway Cabs,
Inc. v. Honer, 154 Neb. 533, 48 N.W.2d 672 (1951); In re Application of
Airline Ground Serv., Inc., 151 Neb. 837, 39 N.W.2d 809 (1949). In these
cases the court referred to these statutes, but did not go beyond
merely citing the section or discussing it regarding another matter.
14The present test uses the term "reasonable" as distinguished from
arbitrary.
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fully explained in Byington v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., where the
court laid down the following rule: 15
[I]t was decided that under this amendment appeals from the
orders of the commission directly to this court are to be considered
and determined in the same manner as appeals from judgments
of the district court upon trial by jury in civil cases. It has
uniformly been held by this court that in such cases the judgment
of the district court will not be reversed unless it affirmatively
appears from the record that it is clearly wrong.
The rule that unless it appears affirmatively from the evidence in
the record that the Commission is "clearly wrong," has been re-
stated in a number of cases which followed Byington,16 but the rule
in this form at least, has not been repeated for many years. Whether
it has been discarded in favor of the rule now found in the cases,
or whether the rules are in reality the same, is a question which
cannot be precisely answered. This question will be discussed after
an examination of the rule as it is presently stated by the court.
A. THE PRESENT RULE
The Nebraska Supreme Court now says its review is not de
novo,17 but whether this rule is actually followed is a difficult ques-
tion to answer.'8 The rule has often been stated as follows: The
only questions for the court are whether the agency acted within
the scope of its authority, and whether or not the order was ar-
bitrary and unreasonable. 19 If the order or decision of the Com-
15 96 Neb. 584, 593, 148 N.W. 520, 523 (1914). This case followed im-
mediately after Hooper Tel. Co. v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 96 Neb. 245, 147
N.W. 674 (1914), which held this method of appeal was constitutional
and that the appeal was to be governed by the statutes that apply to
appeals from the district court.
16 Omaha & C.B. St. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 125 Neb. 825, 252 N.W. 407
(1934); Farmers & Merchants Tel. Co. v. Orleans Community Club, 116
Neb. 633, 218 N.W. 583 (1928); Southern Nebraska Power Co. v. Taylor,
109 Neb. 683, 192 N.W. 317 (1923); Rawlings v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 109
Neb. 167, 190 N.W. 569 (1922); Omaha & C.B. St. Ry. v. Nebraska State
Ry. Comm'n, 103 Neb. 695, 173 N.W. 690 (1919).
17 Publix Cars, Inc. v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 130 Neb. 401, 265 N.W.
234 (1936); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n,
128 Neb. 447, 259 N.W. 362 (1935).
1s See Viren, Appeals from Administrative Agencies to State District
Court, and Appeals from Administrative Agencies to Supreme Court,
41 NEB. L. REv. 397, 407-08 (1962). It is suggested, however, that a
proper application of the rule for this type of case, recognizing the
necessary distinctions, is not equivalent to a trial de novo.
19 See, e.g., Ainsworth Irrigation Dist. v. Bejot, 170 Neb. 257, 102 N.W.2d 416
(1960); County of Grant v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 158
Neb. 310, 63 N.W.2d 459 (1954); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. League of Neb.
Municipalities, 154 Neb. 281, 47 N.W.2d 577 (1951); Effenberger v. Omaha
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mission is supported by competent evidence, the action taken is
not arbitrary, and is thus reasonable and will be sustained on ap-
peal.20 If there is a conflict in the evidence, the conflict is for the
Commission to resolve rather than the court.21 The above is the
rule as ordinarily stated in the cases, but such a statement leaves
many questions unanswered. For example, what does the court
mean by "competent" evidence? Is the Commission at liberty to
disbelieve undisputed evidence? Is merely "some" evidence suffi-
cient or does the court require something more, such as "sub-
stantial" evidence? Is this review upon the whole record or can
the court find some evidence in part of the record supporting
the finding while ignoring contrary evidence in the rest of the
record?
(1) Competent evidence
The phrase "competent" evidence is found in the Nebraska
statute governing the admission of evidence in an administrative
hearing. Section 84-914 provides: 22
In contested cases: (1) An agency may admit and give proba-
tive effect to evidence which possesses probative value com-
monly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs. It shall give effect to the rules of privilege rec-
ognized by law. It may exclude incompetent, irrelevant, im-
material, and unduly repetitious evidence.
The above section is identical to the provision governing the ad-
mission of evidence in the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, and the phrase can also be found in the provision of the
& C.B. St. Ry., 150 Neb. 13, 33 N.W.2d 296 (1948); Furstenberg v. Omaha
& C.B. St. Ry., 132 Neb. 562, 272 N.W.2d 756 (1937).
20 See cases cited note 19 supra.
21 Basin Truck Co. v. R. B. '"ick" Wilson, Inc., 166 Neb. 665, 90 N.W.2d
268 (1958); Publix Cars, Inc. v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 130 Neb. 401
265 N.W. 234 (1936).
22 NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914 (Supp. 1961). For studies of provisions in
other states see Harris, Administrative Practice and Procedure: Com-
parative State Legislation, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 45-49 (1953); Nathan-
son, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrate Law, 33 IowA
L. REV. 252, 268-73 (1948).
23 MODEL ACT § 9(1). Compare this to § 7(c) of the FEDERAL ADmIISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq. (1958),
which provides in part: "Except as statutes otherwise provide, the
proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof. Any oral
or documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a
matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall be imposed or rule or
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Model Act governing judicial review.24 It has been said that the
word "competent," as used in the Model Act, means that some
legally competent evidence to support the finding of fact is re-
quired.25 This view, no doubt, expresses the proper application of
the term as used in Nebraska law. It has been held that the agencies
are not bound to follow strictly all common law rules of evidence,
but that in order to afford the parties a full and fair hearing the
agency should require its action to be supported by competent and
relevant evidence. 26 By implication competent evidence would be
legally competent evidence. This view seems to have been in-
corporated into the rules and regulations of at least one state
agency.
27
(2) Agency acceptance of testimony
Another issue is whether the agency must accept uncontro-
verted testimony. In some cases the refusal to believe such testi-
mony could leave the record bare of any support for the agency's
findings and thus make the agency action unreasonable and ar-
bitrary under the present rule. In the usual case, however, where
there is still evidence to support the finding of the agency, a rule
that the agency cannot refuse to accept undisputed facts may be in-
consistent with the rule that the court is not to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency. The court has held that the Commission
order issued except upon consideration of the whole record or such
portions thereof as may be cited by any party and as supported by and
in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence...."
2 4 MODEL ACT § 12(e) provides for reversal if the agency's decision is
"unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view
of the entire record as submitted." (Emphasis added.) See also § 9(6)
(e) of L. B. 133, 68th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1957), note 4 supra, which is
essentially the same as the provision in the Model Act. The phrase
does not, however, appear in the corresponding section (§ 10(e) ) of the
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT.
25 Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. REV.
196, 208 (1948). This requirement would seem to be similar to the
residuum rule which requires reversal if the finding is not supported by
evidence which would be admissible in a jury trial. See DAVIS §§ 14.10
to .12.
26 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. City of Norfolk, 157 Neb. 594, 60 N.W.2d 662
(1953).
27 Rule 507 (4) of the Rules and Regulations of the Oil and Gas Commission
provides: "[A]ny evidence which is not irrelevant, immaterial, incom-
petent or unduly repetitious may be received and made a part of the
record in the case.... ." R. PRAc. & P. 7.1 of the Railway Commission does
not use this term. For a discussion of the Rules of the Railway Com-
mission see Comment, New Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the
Nebraska Railway Commission, 40 NEB. L. REV. 129 (1960).
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must follow the evidence where no "substantial conflict" exists,28
and the findings of the Commission which are contrary to evidence
without "substantial dispute" are "without evidentiary support and
are necessarily arbitrary."29 The question was answered in the
following manner in L. E. Whitlock Truck Serv., Inc. v. Shippers
Oil Field Traffic Ass'n:30
In this respect it is the rule that where there is evidence supporting
factors which are inconsistent or in conflict with other recognized
factors, the power to decide ordinarily rests with the commission
and not the courts. Under such circumstances this court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the commission .... The com-
mission may not disregard undisputed or admitted facts, although
it may resolve conflicts in the evidence. The exercise of power
by the commission without a proper application of the law to
undisputed or admitted facts is an arbitrary exercise of power
which the courts are required to correct.
If the above rule is limited to the case of documentary evidence,
the rule may be well founded since such evidence would be in the
record for the court to examine, and since the document would not
have been disproved. However, if the question is simply one of the
credibility of a witness, the situation is changed since the appellate
court cannot observe the witness; and the rule may be different in
this situation.3 1
28Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Save the Trains Ass'n, 167 Neb. 61, 69, 91 N.W.2d
312, 318 (1958).
29 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Burgess, 166 Neb. 29, 31-32, 87 N.W.2d 630, 632
(1958).
30171 Neb. 78, 79-80, 105 N.W.2d 588, 591 (1960).
31 "Although the plaintiff's testimony concerning how the accident hap-
pened is not directly contradicted, triers of fact are not compelled to
accept as absolute verity every statement of a witness not contradicted
by direct evidence. The persuasiveness of evidence may be destroyed
even though uncontroverted by direct testimony .... Evidence not di-
rectly contradicted is not necessarily binding on the triers of fact, and
may be given no weight where it is inherently improbable, unreason-
able, self-contradictory, or inconsistent with facts or circumstances in
evidence. Triers of fact have the right to test the credibility of wit-
nesses by their self-interest and to weigh undisputed parol testimony
against facts and circumstances in evidence from which a conclusion
may properly be drawn that the parol testimony is false." Dworak v.
City of Omaha, 172 Neb. 209, 214-15, 109 N.W.2d 160, 163 (1961) (work-
men's compensation case). See NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S.
404 (1962), where the court held that the rule in NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan
Flour Mills Co., 122 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1941), was an improper standard
of review. The test under the latter case was that in reinstatement
cases the employer's statement under oath must be believed unless there
is impeachment or contradiction or unless there are circumstances that
raise doubts as to their consistency with sworn evidence on the point.
For a discussion of the issue of credibility in jury trials, see Dow,
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(3) The record on appeal
In an appeal to the Supreme Court from the Railway Com-
mission the evidence presented before the Commission, as re-
ported by the stenographer, along with the pleadings and filings
constitutes the complete record.32 Under the Nebraska Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, the agency in a contested case must include
findings of fact which consist of a concise statement of the con-
clusions upon each contested issue of fact.33 The review is upon
the whole record,34 and it is difficult to see how the court could
determine whether or not the action was unreasonable or arbitrary
without examining the entire record. This requirement that the
review be upon the whole record actually broadens the scope of
review since evidence standing alone in a portion of the record
supporting the agency determination is not sufficient. Contrary evi-
dence in the rest of the record must also be considered in deciding
whether the order was reasonable.
(4) Sufficiency of the evidence
The question of how much evidence is required to support the
agency's determination is one which cannot be answered by resort
to a phrase such as "substantial," which is the test presently used
on the federal level.3 5 As noted previously, there must be competent
evidence to support the findings, but a requirement of competent
evidence provides no guide to the question of whether merely
"Csome" competent evidence or substantial evidence is required. The
court has said that the findings and orders of the Commission will
not be interfered with on appeal "if any reasonable basis exists
upon which they can be supported," 6 and that such findings cannot
be disturbed unless the "result reached cannot reasonably be de-
Judicial Determination of Credibility in Jury-Tried Actions, 38 NEB.
L. REV. 835 (1959). See also Faulkner v. Simms, 68 Neb. 295, 89 N.W.
171 (1902), where Pound, Comm'r, drew a distinction between the case
of oral testimony and documentary evidence in a case tried before ajudge without a jury.
3 2 NEB REV. STAT. § 75-407 (Reissue 1958). The same type of provision
controls in the case of the Department of Water Resources: § 46-210
(Supp. 1961).
33 NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-915 (Supp. 1961).
84 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. League of Neb. Municipalities, 154 Neb. 281, 47
N.W.2d 577 (1951). The review on the complete record is in accord with
the MODEL ACT § 12 (7) (e) and the FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT § 10(e).
3 5 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 10 (e).
86 In re Application of Effenberger, 150 Neb. 13, 18, 33 N.W.2d 296, 299
(1948).
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rived from the facts proved."37 When the terms "substantial con-
flict" or "substantial dispute" 8 are used, it does not appear that
merely some evidence, or a scintilla of evidence, is sufficient to
support an agency determination. On the other hand, when the
court speaks in terms of any conflict in the evidence being for the
agency to determine,39 the court would not, if it follows this rubric
in practice, be involved in weighing the evidence. A case in point
is In re Application of Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,40 where the only ques-
tion was the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the order
denying the applicant railroad permission to discontinue service
between two cities was not unreasonable or arbitrary. It was un-
contradicted that the trains in question were obsolete for passenger
service. Opposing this was the testimony of interested people on
points such as the lack of adequate transportation for various pur-
poses. Since, purportedly, no questions of law were presented, it is
apparent that there was at least some evidence supporting the Com-
mission's order since the record was filled with the testimony of in-
terested parties. Despite this evidence on the effect of a discon-
tinuance, the Commission's order denying the application was re-
versed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. If this were simply a ques-
tion of the sufficiency of the evidence, it is obvious that more than
"some" or a "scintilla" of evidence is required to support the order.
If the test of "clearly wrong" as laid down in the Byington case
were followed, there is little question as to the correctness of the
result; but that test was not followed. It is clear that some evidence
is not enough, but the ground between this and weighing the evi-
dence, which the court purportedly does not do, is not clear. Is the
typical determination under the test presently used by the court
in reality the "substantial evidence" test followed on the federal
level?
B. A COMPARISON OF THE NEBRASKA RULE TO THE FEDERAL TESTS
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do
more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be es-
tablished. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."41 The sub-
stantial evidence test established on the federal level by the Ad-
37 In re Lincoln Traction Co., 103 Neb. 229, 244, 171 N.W. 192, 197 (1919).
38 See notes 28 and 29 supra.
39 See cases cited note 21 supra.
40 138 Neb. 767, 295 N.W. 389 (1940).
41 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300
(1939).
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ministrative Procedure Act 42 is the same as that used for the re-
view of jury verdicts on the federal level. 43 Assuming that the
Nebraska court still follows the "clearly wrong" test enunciated in
the Byington line of cases,4 4 is that test comparable or equivalent
to the substantial evidence test? In Nebraska the review of jury
verdicts has in many cases been governed by the clearly wrong
test,4 5 and the review of a judge's findings in a law case is the same
4 2 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 10 (e).
43 See DAVIs § 29.02; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1020 (1956); Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges
and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70 (1944).
4 See note 16 supra.
4 5 In Johnston v. Robertson, 171 Neb. 324, 106 N.W.2d 192 (1960), the fol-
lowing statement of the test was made: "The function of this court, in
determining whether or not a verdict has been sustained or whether or
not there is evidence sufficient for submission to a jury, is not to weigh
the evidence, but to ascertain whether or not there is evidence to sustain
the verdict of a jury in the exercise of its function as the trier of the
facts .... It is not the province of this court in reviewing the record
in an action at law to resolve conflicts in or weigh the evidence. In
testing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict, admissible
testimony tending to support the case of the successful party should be
accepted as the truth .... It is presumed in an action at law that con-
troverted facts were decided by the jury in favor of the successful
party, and its findings based on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed
unless clearly wrong.... It has long been the rule that where different
minds may draw different inferences or conclusions from the facts
proved, or if there is a conflict in the evidence, the matter at issue must
be submitted to the jury to be determined." 171 Neb. 324, 327-28, 106
N.W.2d 192, 194-95 (1960) (Emphasis added.); accord, Hermansen v.
Anderson Equip. Co., 174 Neb. 325, 117 N.W.2d 791 (1962); Kunkel v. Co-
hagen, 151 Neb. 774, 39 N.W.2d 609 (1949); Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb.
401, 34 N.W.2d 757 (1948); Boehler v. Kraay, 130 Neb. 233, 264 N.W. 745
(1936); McCann v. McDonald Co., 7 Neb. 305 (1878). But see Conley v.
Hays, 153 Neb. 733, 739, 45 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1951), where the court said:
"In an appeal in a jury case the function of the Supreme Court is not
to weigh the evidence but only to determine whether or not there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, and if the evidence is sub-
stantial and competent but in conflict and is such that reasonable minds
may draw different conclusions therefrom, the verdict of a jury will
not be set aside." Accord, Dyer v. Ilg, 156 Neb. 568, 57 N.W.2d 84 (1953).
A prejudice test is often employed by the court for use in addition to
the clearly wrong test. E.g., Pueppka v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. 165 Neb.
781, 87 N.W.2d 410 (1958); Borcherding v. Elklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55
N.W.2d 643 (1952); Davis v. Security Ins. Co., 139 Neb. 730, 298 N.W.
687 (1941); Cuva v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 136 Neb. 359, 285 N.W. 917
(1939). For a general discussion see Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience
of Appellate Courts, 41 MiNN. L. REV. 751 (1957).
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as that for review of the verdict of a jury.40 This test may best be
compared to the "clearly erroneous" test on the federal level which
is the scope of review of findings of a judge without a jury.47 On
the federal level the substantial evidence test and the "clearly
erroneous" test involve a different scope of review, with the scope
of review under the "clearly erroneous" test being broader. This
is apparent since a finding can be clearly wrong without being un-
reasonable.4 The same comparison shows that Nebraska no longer
follows the Byington case since the present test is one based upon
reasonableness.
Rather than attempting to equate the state rule to the federal
rule by comparing the scope of review of jury verdicts or the find-
ings of a judge without a jury to the scope of review of administra-
tive determinations, it is more meaningful to compare the rules in
terms of the common characteristics and essential elements. As
previously noted, the present rule does not appear to be the equiva-
lent of the scope of review for jury verdicts in Nebraska. Instead,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has promulgated a rule under which
the agency determination will not be disturbed if it is reasonable,
as distinguished from arbitrary,49 with conflicts in the evidence
being for the Commission, as the trier of fact, to resolve.50 The court
has spoken in terms of "any reasonable basis" for the action being
sufficient to support the agency finding.51 It would not seem that
"reasonable basis" differs from "such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." 52 A "reason-
able basis" indeed requires more than arbitrary action, not as much
as a clearly wrong or clearly erroneous test would require,53 and no
4 0 Shreve v. Agricultural Prods. Co. 173 Neb. 219, 113 N.W.2d 58 (1962);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kersey, 171 Neb. 212, 106 N.W.2d 31
(1960); Dunbier v. Stanton, 170 Neb. 541, 103 N.W.2d 797 (1960); Faltz
v. Brakhage, 151 Neb. 216, 36 N.W.2d 768 (1949); In re Estate of Donlen,
145 Neb. 370, 16 N.W.2d 731 (1944); Bank of Roca v. Meyer, 135 Neb.
128, 280 N.W. 449 (1938).
47FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See DAVIs § 29.02; Stern, supra note 43. Note that
this test would be the federal test under the proposed CODE OF FEDERAL
AMINISmTRATIVE PROCEDURE § 1009(f). See Woll, Administrative Law
Reform: Proposals and Prospects, 41 NEB. L. REV. 687 (1962), for a dis-
cussion of the proposed code.
48 See Stern, supra note 43, at 80-81.
49 In re Effenberger, 150 Neb. 13, 33 N.W.2d 296 (1948).
50 See cases cited note 21 supra.
51 In re Effenberger, 150 Neb. 13, 33 N.W.2d 296 (1948).
52 See note 41 supra.
53 See DAvis § 20.02; Stern, supra note 43, at 81.
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doubt does not involve a weighing of the evidence if conflicts in
the evidence are for the agency to resolve. Of course, it may be
argued that the substantial evidence test may easily become a test
in which the evidence is weighed, 54 but this results from the failure
to draw the necessary distinctions, rather than from the lack of a
difference between the various tests. It would seem that when the
Nebraska court speaks of reasonable action, as distinguished from
arbitrary action, with the agency findings being reasonable if sup-
ported by sufficient evidence, there is little difference from the
federal test of substantial evidence.
The entire area of the scope of review of administrative de-
terminations in Nebraska is vague, and the rules governing such
review lack precision. One reason for this is that many of the prob-
lems which can be raised have not been answered by the court.
Another difficulty is that the court does not make a clear distinction
between questions of law and questions of fact. The distinctions
drawn and the tests followed on the federal level55 in this respect
do not appear to have been used in Nebraska. The result of this
vagueness is that the state of the evidence is necessarily judged by
some subjective feeling on the part of the court. This could be
avoided to some extent by a more precise statement of the rule;
but it cannot, and should not, be avoided completely.
II. STATUTORY APPEAL WITH THE SCOPE
OF REVIEW PROVIDED BY STATUTE
Nebraska has a great many situations in which the statutes
expressly provide for de novo review, or have been so interpreted.
An examination of these situations should provide some insight
into the use of the trial de novo and the desirability of such a broad
scope of review for agency action.
It is first essential to determine the scope of de novo review.
The statute may provide that the appeal shall be heard as in
equity, and it is in this area that appeals from the district court
to the supreme court are heard de novo. Section 25-1925 provides: 51
In all appeals from the district court to the supreme court in suits
in equity, wherein review of some or all of the findings of fact
of the district court is asked by the appellant, it shall be the duty
of the supreme court to retry the issue or issues of fact involved
in the finding or findings of fact complained of upon the evidence
preserved in the bill of exceptions, and upon trial de novo of such
54 See Jaffe, supra note 43, at 1028.
55 See DAVIS § 30.05.
56NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1925. (Reissue 1956).
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questions of fact, reach an independent conclusion as to what find-
ing or findings are required under the pleadings and all the
evidence, without reference to the conclusion reached in the district
court or the fact that there may be some evidence in support
thereof.
These actions in equity are heard de novo subject to the rule
that where credible evidence on material questions of fact is in
irreconcilable conflict, the court will, in determing the weight of
the evidence, consider the fact that the trial court observed the
witnesses and their manner of testifying, and must have accepted
one version of the facts rather than the opposite.57 Also it has been
said that if the party upon whom the burden is imposed has failed
to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
will reverse the judgment.58 Even with these rules as a guide, there
are questions which can arise, and which can make a great dif-
ference in the scope of review exercised by the court. For example,
the court may have to determine whether or not an appeal to the
district court which is to be heard de novo is to be considered as
an equity case. If so, the review as provided by section 25-192559
is de novo; if not, the scope of review on appeal to the supreme
court would be more limited.0
A. DE Novo REvIEw IN TAXATION MATTERS
One of the most litigated areas concerning de novo review in-
volves actions by State Board of Equalization and Assessment. A
direct appeal to the Supreme Court is provided in the case of the
Board's assessment of railroad property. The statute provides that
the court "is vested with jurisdiction to hear and determine the
matter in controversy de novo upon the record so presented, and
any additional evidence introduced."' 1 This clearly provides for a
completely independent determination upon the record, but there
is a presumption attached. This was explained in Chicago, B. &
57Dunbier v. Rafert, 170 Neb. 570, 103 N.W.2d 814 (1960); Pike v. Triska,
165 Neb. 104, 84 N.W.2d 311 (1957); Uptegrove v. Elasser, 161 Neb. 527,
74 N.W.2d 61 (1955); Sapcich v. Tangeman, 153 Neb. 506, 45 N.W.2d 478(1951); Kuenzli v. Kuenzli, 150 Neb. 855, 36 N.W.2d 247 (1949).
58 Trowbridge v. Donner, 152 Neb. 206, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950).
5 NEB. REV. STAT. (Reissue 1956).
60 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
61NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-617 (Reissue 1958). Section 77-618 provides that
the court "shall adjudge and determine the assessable value" and may
lower or raise the assessment as it deems "just and equitable."
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Q. R.R. v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, in the follow-
ing manner: 6 2
There is a presumption that when an assessing authority values
property for taxation purposes it acts fairly and legally upon
sufficient evidence to sustain its action but the presumption dis-
appears if there is evidence to the contrary and thereafter the
reasonableness and legality of the valuation made by the assessing
authority is one of fact to be determined from evidence, unaided
by presumption, and the burden of showing an improper assess-
ment is upon the complaining party.
A quite similar presumption is used by the court where the
appeal is from the county board of equalization to the district
court.63 This appeal is governed by section 77-151164 which provides
that the district court shall hear the appeal "as in equity and with-
out a jury, and determine anew all questions raised before the
county board." Also, the district court is to affirm the action taken
unless it was unreasonable or arbitrary,6 5 a phrase which appears
to be inconsistent with the other command to "determine anew"
all questions raised before the board. Also the complaining tax-
payer must have "clear and convincing" proof that the finding was
erroneous.6 6 Since this appeal is in equity in the district court, it is
heard de novo in the supreme court67 where the review would seem
to be the same as for cases appealed directly to the supreme court
from an assessment of railroad property. It has been noted that
the presumptions accorded the two situations are the same, 8 and,
as noted above, even with de novo review the taxpayer must prove
the finding erroneous by "clear and convincing" proof. This re-
62 170 Neb. 77, 84, 101 N.W.2d 856, 862 (1960). Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 170 Neb. 106, 101 N.W.2d 873
(1960), and Union P. R.R. v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
170 Neb. 139, 101 N.W.2d 892 (1960), were companion cases and are to
the same effect.
6 3 Baum Realty Co. v. Board of Equalization, 169 Neb. 682, 100 N.W.2d
730 (1960); Ahern v. Board of Equalization, 160 Neb. 709, 71 N.W.2d
307 (1955).
6 4 NEB. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1961).
65 NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1511 (Supp. 1961).
OGNewman v. County of Dawson, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959); Le
Dioyt v. County of Keith, 161 Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455 (1956); Novak v.
Board of Equalization, 145 Neb. 664, 17 N.W.2d 882 (1945), quoting with
approval, First Nat'l Bank v. Webster County, 77 Neb. 815, 113 N.W. 190
(1906).
67 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1925 (Reissue 1956); Newman v. County of Dawson,
167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959); Le Dioyt v. County of Keith, 161
Neb. 615, 74 N.W.2d 455 (1956).
68 See note 63 supra.
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quirement of "clear and convincing" proof is of course more than
a preponderance of the evidence. It is clear that a trial de novo in
which the questions are decided independently of the prior decisions
is not given in this situation, notwithstanding the statutory provi-
sions, when the burden upon the complaining party is considered.
This is particularly true when the statute itself provides for no re-
versal unless the action of the board was unreasonable or arbitrary.
This is not to say that the result is undesirable; if there is actually
any deviation from the statute, it may result from a recognition of
administrative expertise in a complicated area.
B. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION LEADING TO DE Novo REVIEW
There are situations in which the statute is not clear on the
nature of the review to be given upon appeal since the statute pro-
vides for simply an "original" action or does not mention the type
of action at all. One example of this occurred in an appeal from
the State Real Estate Commission. The statute in force at the time
provided for the filing of an "original action" in the district court
by a license holder desiring to appeal a revocation or suspension of
his license.69 This proceeding was held to be an original action,
equitable in nature, in Feight v. State Real Estate Comm'n, where
the justification and the rules were stated as follows: 70
The court is required to determine only the issues thus raised. It
appears therefore that it was the intent of the Legislature to
provide more than a review to determine whether the order com-
plained of was arbitrary or capricious .... We think the general
rule is that where a review of a finding and order of an admin-
istrative officer, board, or commission is afforded by the filing
of an original action in the district court, the issues to be deter-
mined are those raised by the pleadings and not those raised
before the officer, board, or commission. Such a suit will be
tried as any other civil action when the statute does not prescribe
the procedure to be followed or limit the scope of the determina-
tion to be made.
It is to be noted that by holding the proceeding an equitable
one there is de novo review in the supreme court.71 The intent
of the legislature may have been reached in this case, but the result
69 NEB. LAWS c. 171, § 23 (1943) (now NEB. Rmv. STAT. § 81-884.02 (Reissue
1958)). For another statute with the same type of provision see §
60-1415 (Reissue 1960) (Dep't of Motor Vehicles-motor vehicles dealers
licensing board).
70 151 Neb. 867, 872-73, 39 N.W.2d 823, 826-27 (1949). This case was fol-
lowed in Rhoades v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 152 Neb. 701, 42 N.W.2d
610 (1950).
7' NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1925 (Reissue 1956). See note 57 supra and ac-
companying text for the rule in such cases.
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may not necessarily be desirable. Perhaps this "original action"
could have been viewed the same as a case in law heard by a judge
without a jury, in which case the scope of review would have
been limited.72 Here there is de novo review of an administrative
order made after a full hearing. Such a hearing is unnecessary
duplication and tends to render the administrative procedure use-
less. It is doubtful whether the supreme court could have held
this to be a proceeding in error 73 since the term "original" is con-
trary to this idea, and since the method of lodging jurisdiction in
the district court was provided, thus distinguishing this case from
those in which it was held that a petition in error must be used.74
The statute now provides for de novo review upon the record and
no longer allows a completely new trial, but additional evidence
may be introduced. 75
Another situation in which the statute is silent upon the nature
of a hearing in the district court can be seen in In re Iverson.76
Here the State Fire Marshal issued an order to defendant requiring
demolition of a building. The fire marshal sought enforcement
of the order under section 81-517 which merely provides that the
court is to hear and determine the issues raised.7 7 The court held
that the hearing and determination of the issues constituted a trial
in equity, rejecting the contention that the question was limited to
whether or not there had been an abuse of discretion. Noting that
the action was ex parte, the court said that the hearing is a "trial"
of the issues made by the order and his objections, and not a review
of the prior proceedings. The explanation of this holding was
that: 78
Although the provisions of section 81-518 ["If upon such trial the
order shall be sustained"] . . .when standing alone, might be
72 See note 46 supra and the accompanying text for this rule.
73 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1901 et seq. (Reissue 1956).
74 The right of appeal is purely statutory and unless the statute provides
for an appeal, such a right does not exist. The failure of the statute to
provide for any procedural method for lodging jurisdiction in the
district court defeats the right of appeal. From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411,
56 N.W.2d 441 (1953).
75 NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-884.02 (Reissue 1958); Gillespie v. State Real Estate
Comm'n, 172 Neb. 308, 109 N.W.2d 305 (1961).
76 151 Neb. 802, 39 N.W.2d 797 (1949).
77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-517 (Reissue 1958) which provides, in part: "[I]f
an answer be filed and served as herein provided, the court shall hear
and determine the issues so raised and give judgment thereon as herein
provided."
78 In re Iverson, 151 Neb. 802, 807, 39 N.W.2d 797, 800 (1949).
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construed to limit the judgment of the court either to sustain or set
aside the order of the State Fire Marshal, yet the statutes when
considered in their several provisions do not justify that con-
clusion. The legislative policy contemplates that the owner shall
have a trial and a determination on the merits in the district court.
Although the statute does not so define the proceeding, it appears
that the powers conferred upon the court are those which are
generally classed as equitable, as distinguished from actions at law.
Here as in Feight, there is de novo review as a result of statu-
tory interpretation. In this case the review given may well be justi-
fied for several reasons. It involves an ex parte order rather than
a finding based upon the evidence acquired in a full hearing where
each party has an opportunity to present his case, as was the
situation in Feight. This case involved an action to enforce an order
rather than any type of appeal, and in such case a petition in error
(which is a method of appeal) would not be appropriate.7 9 Any
other holding could not have given the review which the legislature
obviously intended. In both the Feight and Iverson cases the court
may have gone to some lengths to find that de novo review was
proper in scope. The statutory provisions in such cases presented
a serious dilemma for the supreme court, and there was no rea-
sonable alternative to the actual holdings. The result itself was
not necessarily undesirable in the Iverson case, but in Feight the
review given is very broad considering the type of administrative
proceeding concerned.
The cases discussed above illustrate the type of statutory prob-
lems which may arise, and the broad review which can result. In
addition, there are a number of statutory provisions regarding the
scope of review which are very unclear. These provisions are usu-
ally either meaningless, or often contradictory, and almost always
present difficult questions of interpretation. One example, which
is unlike any other Nebraska provision, is the scope of review on
appeal from the Department of Agriculture and Inspection when
the license of the operator of a mobile home court has been denied
or revoked. Here the "ruling, decision, or order of the department
... shall be as final and binding as the final order or judgment of
a court of general jurisdiction"; but the appeal is heard as in equity
and the district court is to determine anew all questions raised be-
fore the director of the department.80 Although it is not expressly
provided, a trial de novo is obviously contemplated. The provision
referring to the same review as in courts of general jurisdiction
is very questionable. The only possible reconciliation would be
79 See note 74 supra.
80 NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2,205 (Reissue 1958).
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to interpret the "final order or judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction" as a finding of a judge in an equity case. This pro-
vision is, of course, an extreme example of the type of statutory
review in this area, but other examples of confusing statutory
provisions may be found.8'
C. VARIOUS STATUTORY TESTS DEFINING THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
Another difficulty with statutory provisions in this area is the
great variety of tests used to describe the scope of review to be
followed. A survey of some of these various statutes will show
the difficulties involved if an authoritative interpretation should
be required, and this situation presents a strong argument for
a uniform statutory standard. One test used is "abuse of dis-
cretion" which is found in the Nebraska "Blue-Sky" Law.8 2
"Unlawful and unreasonable" standards govern the scope of review
on appeals from the Board of Barber Examiners with the Depart-
ment of Health; 83 but within the same department, on appeals from
the Board of Examiners in Basic Sciences, the phrase without "just
cause" is to be used in appeals from a denial of an examination.84
On appeal from the Auction Livestock Market Board to the district
court, the court "shall not substitute its discretion for that of the
board but shall determine whether the board acted capriciously,
arbitrarily, or abused its discretion and whether it acted according
to law. '85 Even the federal test of "substantial evidence" is used in
the provisions for the scope of review,8 6 but to offset this test is
the provision that the findings made by the Board of Cosmetologist
81 See NEs. REV. STAT. § 46-805 (Reissue 1960). This statute states that
the appeal "shall be heard and determined upon proofs by the applicant
and the department." It was held in Lackaff v. Department of Roads
and Irrigation, 153 Neb. 217, 43 N.W.2d 576 (1950), that this appeal is
within the rule of the Iverson case and is heard as in equity.
82 NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-328 (Reissue 1958). Upon this appeal, "merely
technical irregularities ... shall be disregarded ... and the court shall
receive and consider any relevant evidence . . .but shall be limited to
the consideration and determination of the question whether there has
been an abuse of discretion. .. ." See Robertson, Administrative Control
Over Security Issues in Nebraska, 11 NEB. L. BULL. 116, 170 (1932).
83 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-235 (Reissue 1958). Note that this standard may
not be any different than that for review of the determinations of the
State Railway Commission. See note 19 supra.
84 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-409 (Reissue 1958).
8 5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-1140 (Supp. 1961).
8 6NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-263.16 (Supp. 1961) (Grade A Milk Law). "The
court shall set aside the order . . . if it finds that [it is] not in ac-
cordance with law or ... not supported by substantial evidence."
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Examiners acting within its power, are conclusive "in the absence
of fraud."87 The above illustrations are exceptions to the general
statutory provisions for de novo review. The latter are worded
somewhat differently, but undoubtedly they all provide for de novo
review upon the record. The statute may provide for the appeal
to be heard as "in equity, and without a jury,"88s simply "in equity,"89
"de novo" in the manner of suits in equity,90 or simply "de novo."91
The result is exactly the same despite the phraseology differences,
except that some of the statutes could be interpreted to allow a
completely new trial, or go beyond a trial de novo on the record,
since additional evidence may be introduced. Workmen's com-
pensation is another area in which de novo review is granted,92
and appeals from the Department of Labor in the area of employ-
ment security are de novo upon the record.93
D. DE Novo REVIEW-A CRmIcAL VIEw
Serious objections to the broad scope of review granted in many
situations may be raised. These objections sometimes lead a court
to restrict the review given under statutes which purport to
87 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-339 (Supp. 1961). The statute, however, goes on to
provide that "the district court ... shall have the power to review such
proceedings in accordance with the laws of this state...."
8 8 NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-150 (Reissue 1960) (Dep't of Banking); § 44-154
(Reissue 1960) (Dep't of Insurance); § 60-420 (Reissue 1960) (Dep't of
Motor Vehicles.-"determine anew all questions raised").
8 9 NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-503 (Reissue 1960) (Dep't of Motor Vehicles);
§ 75-611 (Reissue 1958) (Bd. of Educational Lands and Funds).
90 NEB. REV. STAT. § 1-149 (Reissue 1962) (Bd. of Public Accountancy-
heard and tried de novo in the manner provided for trial of suits in
equity, but additional testimony may be introduced); § 44-1441 (Re-
issue 1960) (Dep't of Insurance); § 44-1485 (Reissue 1960) (Dep't of
Insurance); § 53-1,116 (Reissue 1960) (State Liquor Comm'n-addi-
tional testimony may be introduced); § 59-303 (Reissue 1960) (Dep't
of Insurance).
91NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-913 (Supp. 1961) (Oil and Gas Conservation
Comm'n); § 71-159 (Reissue 1958) (Dep't of Health).
92 The workmen's compensation area has been extensively discussed. See
II FISHER, COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION IN NEBRASKA §§ 725r-27 (1950);
Cashen, Practice and Procedure Before Nebraska Workmen's Compen-
sation Court, 41 NEB. L. REV. 151, 165-68 (1961); Cashen, Appeals From
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction to State District Court, 41 NEB. L. REV.
410, 424-30 (1962). For a discussion of de novo review in this area see
DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 358-85 (1936).
9 3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-639 (Reissue 1960). The appeal to the Supreme
Court is taken in the same manner as appeals arising under the work-
men's compensation law.
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grant de novo review,94 and such a restricted interpretation in
some states serves to prevent problems involving the doctrine of
separation of powers.95 The advisability of this type of extensive
review is rarely discussed by the courts, and a serious study of the
situation could well lead to a judicial reluctance to grant such
review in situations where a full administrative hearing has been
held. The entire concept of administrative expertise and discretion
is buried when a complete de novo review is allowed. The dupli-
cate independent determinations waste time and the litigant's
money, and render the administrative procedures often times
useless. If the administrative agency has the burden of implement-
ing consistent policies, extensive judicial review may be a severe
handicap.96 Even if de novo review is limited to the record, most
of the same objections apply with equal vigor. There are situations
in which extensive review is both essential and highly desirable.
If the administrative action is ex parte, and without a hearing, the
arguments in favor of de novo review are very persuasive.9 7 With-
out the administrative record an independent judicial inquiry is
essential, but in the situation in which there has been a full
administrative hearing and a record made, a trial de novo is an
unwarranted and unnecessary judicial control.98
94See the illustration of appeals from the State Board of Equalization and
Assessment. See 4 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2907 (1958).
95 See Note, De Novo Judicial Review of State Administrative Findings,
65 HARv. L. REV. 1217, 1222 (1952). See also Baird, Judicial Review of
Administrative Procedures in Minnesota, 46 MINN. L. REV. 451, 477
(1962).
96 For a good treatment of this type of situation see Davis, Judicial Emascu-
lation of Administrative Action and Oil Proration: Another View, 19
TEx. L. REV. 29, 42 (1940).
97 If the administrative action is ex parte, the courts are much more dis-
posed to allow extensive review. See the Iverson case discussed pre-
viously in text at note 76 supra. See Note, Judicial Review of Admin-
istrative Adjudicatory Action Taken Without a Hearing, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 698 (1957), in which this idea is fully developed. Professor Jaffee
of Harvard concurs with this view; Jaffee, Judicial Review: Constitu-
tional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L. REV. 953, 967 n.48 (1957).
Professor Merrill would also seem to agree with this approach. See Mer-
rill, Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, A Functional Pros-
pectus, 23 NEB. L. REV. 56, 73 (1944).
98 Merrill, supra note 97, at 72-73, condemns the de novo trial in these
terms: '"There is no good reason why review upon the administrative
record may not be made equally efficient to that resulting from de novo
hearing.... Hence de novo trial does not seem an indispensable safe-
guard against arbitrary acts.... Accordingly, it is suggested that, view-
ing the problem in the light of governmental expediency, dissociated
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III. THE PETITION IN ERROR
In addition to the situations in which there is a statutory pro-
vision for appeal there are many situations in which such an
appeal is not provided, or in which the method of appeal is unclear.
This type of situation is found primarily in cases where the admin-
istrative action is that of a local body rather than a state agency.
The law in this area is stated in From v. Sutton:99
[T]he Legislature intended, by the statute it enacted, to extend to
any parties coming within the scope thereof the right to an appeal
which would entitle them to a retrial of the whole cause but
failed to provide any procedural method for lodging jurisdiction
thereof in the district court. This failure of the statute to so provide
defeats the right for, as already stated, the right to appeal together
with the mode and manner thereof are purely statutory.
Since the right is purely statutory, appeals from agencies, such
as local administrative bodies or officials, must be either by a
petition in error 00 or, perhaps, by one of the extraordinary remedies
such as mandamus or injunction. Even if the parties would stipu-
late that the case should be considered and tried as an appeal
proceeding or as an original action, the district court would still
not have jurisdiction to hear the case except as a proceeding in
error.1' 1 This method of obtaining judicial review has been used
in a great variety of situations,10 2 and the question here is the scope
of judicial review available in this type of proceeding.
Section 25-1901103 provides that a judgment or final order made
by a county court, justice of the peace or "any other tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial functions, and inferior in jurisdiction
to the district court" may be reversed, vacated or modified by the
district court. This statute contains no provision concerning the
from existing decisions, the de novo trial of fact issues of any sort
in the review of administrative action, taken after an adequate hearing,
should be abandoned."
99 156 Neb. 411, 414, 56 N.W.2d 441, 443 (1953); accord, Elliott v. City of
Auburn, 172 Neb. 1, 108 N.W.2d 328 (1961); Jungman v. Collidge, 157
Neb. 122, 58 N.W.2d 828 (1953); Roberts v. City of Mitchell, 131 Neb.
672, 269 N.W. 515 (1936). NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1032 (Reissue 1960) and§ 79-1544 (Reissue 1958) would seem to fall within this rule.
'
00 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1956). The appeal provision for the
Department of Aeronautics provides for error proceedings. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 3-140 (Reissue 1962).
101 Roberts v. City of Mitchell, 131 Neb. 672, 269 N.W. 515 (1936).
102 See II FISHER, COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION nq NEBRASKA § 468 (1950).
The petition in error is discussed fully in this work, §§ 468-76.
103 NEB. REV. STAT, (Reissue 1956). A final. order is defined in § 25-1902.
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type of hearing in the district court. But in error proceedings from
the county court and the justice of the peace the procedure is the
same as though the action had been originally instituted in the
district court, and the case is retained for trial on the merits if
there is a reversal of the judgment on other than jurisdictional
grounds. 0 4 However, in the case of appeals from tribunals or boards
the review does not seem to be the same. In Mathews v. Hedlunk'0 5
error proceedings were brought to review the order of the State
Board of Health cancelling the defendant's license to practice
medicine. Concerning the rule to be used in reviewing the order,
the court stated:10 6
[I]n error proceedings prosecuted to the district court from a final
order of the state board of health, the judgment should be affirmed
if all of the jurisdictional facts were established by any competent
evidence, even though opposed by other and weighty evidence.
In referring to the evidence as "competent" we mean evidence for
that character of proceedings.
In Mathews the court also approved a rule from a previous case
in which it was held that the findings would not be disturbed unless
it clearly appears that there is no evidence to uphold them. 07 The
above standard seems to have developed into a rule quite similar to
that used in reviewing the findings of the State Railway Commis-
sion.108 In one recent case, Lynch v. City of Omaha, it was decided
that if the agency is within its jurisdiction, and if the jurisdictional
facts essential to uphold its findings are sustained by some compe-
tent evidence, the findings will be upheld. 0 9 Another case, decided
104 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-544 (Reissue 1956) and § 27-1305 (Reissue 1956).
Rogers v. Bodie, 112 Neb. 672, 200 N.W. 799 (1924).
105 82 Neb. 825, 119 N.W. 17 (1908).
100 Id. at 833, 119 N.W. at 20.
107 Munk v. Frink, 81 Neb. 631, 116 N.W. 525 (1908).
10s The rule here is that the orders will not be reversed if the agency is
within the scope of its authority and if the order was reasonable and
not arbitrary. The action is not arbitrary and is reasonable if it is sup-
ported by competent evidence. See notes 19 and 20 supra.
109 "In error proceedings taken from findings and orders of an administra-
tive agency or body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, as in the case
at bar, only two questions are ordinarily presented for decision. The
general rule is that if it appears in such cases that such agency or body
has acted within its judisdiction and that all of the jurisdictional facts
essential to uphold its findings and orders are sustained by some com-
petent evidence, such findings and orders will be upheld in error pro-
ceedings to the district court and on appeal to this court." Lynch v.
City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 147, 150-51, 43 N.W.2d 589, 591-92 (1950). The
court followed Mathews v. Hedlunk, 82 Neb. 825, 119 N.W. 17 (1908),
and Munk v. Frink, 81 Neb. 631, 116 N.W. 525 (1908).
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the same year, held that if the order is not arbitrary or capricious
it will be upheld, and stated that if there is evidence to sustain
the finding it is not unreasonable." 0
While these cases may have developed a rule which is the
equivalent of the rubric presently employed by the supreme court
in cases appealed from the Railway Commission, there are great
difficulties involved with its application. It is subject to the
same questions as the rule used in appeals from the Commission,
in addition to special problems in this area. The exact meaning
of the phrase "jurisdictional facts" is difficult to ascertain. In some
of the cases the term does not appear,"' but it is used in Mathews
and Lynch. The phrase was most recently discussed by the supreme
court in Elliott v. City of Auburn, a collateral attack rather than
an error proceeding, where the court stated:" 2
The city council was the proper party to determine in the first
instance whether or not the petition presented to it was signed by
the required number of property owners. The power to determine
that question was judicial. Its determination of the question was
made within the scope of the subject matter over which its author-
ity extended and, the council having decided that the facts existed
which were necessary to give it jurisdiction to act, the finding is
conclusive and cannot be collaterally attacked even though the
finding may have been erroneous.
The above statement defining a jurisdictional fact would
seem to be the same as the view on the federal level where
jurisdictional facts are those whose "existence is a condition prece-
dent to the operation of the statutory scheme"" 83 the determina-
tion of which must be left for the courts. Elliott, while not an
error proceeding, does provide some insight into what a jurisdic-
tional fact is and makes it clear that such facts cannot be collater-
ally attacked; but in an error proceeding, jurisdictional facts are
reviewable according to Mathews and Lynch, and such facts in error
proceedings would seem to be the same as those discussed in Elliott.
The similarity of this concept in Nebraska to the concept once
110 Lewis v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 11, 43 N.W.2d 419 (1950). The court
here also approved Mathews v. Hedlunk, supra note 109.
M1 The phrase is not used in Lewis v. City of Omaha, supra note 110, or in
Munk v. Frink, 81 Neb. 631, 116 N.W. 525 (1908).
112 172 Neb. 1, 11-12, 108 N.W.2d 328, 334 (1961).
"
3 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932). See 4 DAvis, ADIniSTRATI
LAW § 29.08 (1958); Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review
of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact,"
80 U. PA. L. REv. 1055 (1932); Jaffee, Judicial Review: Constitutional
and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L. REV. 953 (1957); Schwartz, Does
the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. Rsv. 163 (1949).
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used on the federal level is of little help for, in the words of Pro-
fessor Davis, "apparently no one has ever succeeded in ascertaining
the difference between fundamental or jurisdictional facts and other
facts. 11 4 The use of such a term in the opinions is unfortunate,
but perhaps not fatal, when the review given the findings of juris-
dictional facts is considered. However, when these facts are
reviewed, the rule here is far from equivalent to the rule used on
appeal from the Railway Commission; and the cases which do
not use the phrase "jurisdictional fact" are completely irreconcil-
able with the concept. Under either view the scope of review
is quite narrow and is far from an independent determination by the
court. The determination of what actions are judicial or quasi-
judicial is necessary, and this question is not much easier to answer
than the question concerning "jurisdictional facts."
In this area, as in the area of appeals from the Railway Com-
mission, there are cases which indicate that the scope of review is
the same as that for the review of jury verdicts. In From v. Sutton
the court quoted with approval the following: "In such error pro-
ceedings the orders of the county board will be given the same
weight and conclusiveness as the verdict of a jury, or the findings
and judgment of a court, and will not be reversed or set aside unless
it clearly appears that the evidence fails to sustain them."" 5 In
From the parties had in effect lodged the action in the district court
by error proceedings, and the district court was, upon remand, to
consider the case on that basis rather than granting a retrial of
the whole cause as the district court had done previously. This
type of review on the record is, of course, the rule promulgated in
the Byington case,116 and the two sets of rules are no easier to
reconcile in this area than they were in the area of appeals from
the Railway Commission. Perhaps, in this area, the distinction could
be drawn between judicial acts and non-judicial acts with the
result being a different test for the two, but the statute providing
for petition in error uses the phrase "exercising judicial func-
tions. 11 7 However, if this statute is limited to agencies or tribunals
exercising judicial functions, no appeal of any type whatsoever
"14 DAvis, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW § 29.08 at 158-59 (1958).
115 156 Neb. 411, 418, 56 N.W.2d 441, 445 (1953), quoting Dodge County v.
Acorn, 72 Neb. 71, 72, 100 N.W. 136 (1904). For the test in the case of
jury verdicts see note 45 supra and accompanying text.
116 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
117 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1956).
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would be allowed from a board exercising executive functions if
no statutory appeal exists for that board, since the right to appeal
is purely statutory and the petition in error could not be used.
IV. CONCLUSION
The precise limits of the rules governing the scope of review
for administrative determinations in Nebraska are difficult to
ascertain, but this is not unusual, nor is a charge of vagueness
necessarily an insurmountable objection. Some degree of flexibil-
ity is desirable and essential. However, lack of precision in the
rules leads to the conclusion that often the court must judge
the evidence subjectively. Despite the many unanswered questions
in this area, adoption of the federal "substantial evidence" test is
not necessarily the solution. A recognition by the court of the
problems raised by the present test is necessary if a more precise
rule is to be developed.
De novo review which is allowed in a great many cases by
statute is at times unwarranted and undesirable, but in cases
where there has been no administrative hearing and no record, an
independent judicial determination is essential to safeguard the
rights of the parties and to prevent arbitrary ex parte action. In
this area, as well as in the cases where petition in error is the only
available remedy, legislative action is sorely needed. A uniform
method of appeal and a general statutory provision such as the
provision in the Model Act may be the answer. However, de novo
review should not be allowed in all cases, and the "no-man's" land
of the petition in error should be included in any statutory changes.
The introduction of additional methods of appeal or additional rules
governing the scope of review should be studiously avoided, and
the wide variations in both method of appeal and the scope of
review from agency to agency should be eliminated. The problem
of promulgating uniform provisions in this area where procedures
are quite diverse, and actions taken are of every variety, are not
denied. Nevertheless, the difficulties involved in changing rules,
and the variations in procedures and types of actions, should
not prevent litigants from obtaining adequate judicial review.
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